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Abstract. The goal of this paper is to develop a counterfactual theory of 
explanation (for short, CTE). The CTE provides a monist framework for causal 
and non-causal explanations, according to which both causal and non-causal 
explanations are explanatory by virtue of revealing counterfactual dependencies 
between the explanandum and the explanans. I argue that the CTE is applicable 
to two paradigmatic examples of non-causal explanations: Euler’s explanation 
and renormalization group explanations of universality. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Since the mid-2000s, a consensus (or the closest one gets to a consensus in 
philosophy) has emerged in the literature on the scientific explanations, 
according to which there are causal and non-causal scientific explanations. I call 
this claim the ‘liberal consensus’. The liberal consensus has two sources: first, it 
rests on well-known examples of causal explanations in the natural and social 
sciences, including detailed mechanistic explanations, especially in the life 
sciences (Bechtel and Richardson 1993; Machamer et al. 2000), and less detailed 
‘higher-level’ or ‘macro’ causal explanations (Cartwright 1989; Woodward 
2003). Second, the liberal consensus also gains support from compelling 
examples of non-causal explanations. Such examples include different kinds of 
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‘purely’ or ‘distinctively’ mathematical explanations such as graph-theoretic 
(Pincock 2012; Lange 2013a), topological (Huneman 2010; Lange 2013a), 
geometric (Lange 2013a), and statistical explanations (Lipton 2004; Lange 
2013b). Other kinds of non-causal explanations, especially in physics, include 
explanations based on symmetry principles and conservation laws (Lange 2011), 
kinematics (Saatsi forthcoming), renormalization group theory (Batterman 2000; 
Reutlinger 2014), dimensional analysis (Lange 2009), and inter-theoretic 
relations (Batterman 2002; Weatherall 2011).  
 The liberal consensus is not an innocent assumption, because the 
currently dominating accounts of scientific explanation are causal accounts. 
According to causal accounts, there is a tight conceptual connection between 
explaining and identifying or representing causes (see, among many others, 
Salmon 1984; Cartwright 1989; Machamer et al. 2000; Woodward 2003; 
Strevens 2008). The common core of seminal causal accounts of explanation can 
be expressed as follows: to explain some phenomenon P just is to identify the 
(type or token level) causes of P. The liberal consensus is a direct challenge to 
causal accounts, because causal accounts of explanation – prima facie – cannot 
accommodate non-causal explanations and, hence, causal accounts do not 
provide a general account of all scientific explanations (as van Fraassen [1980: 
123]; Achinstein [1983: 230-243]; Lipton [2004: 32] already noted).1  
 This dialectic situation leaves us with the task to come up with a 
theoretical response to the liberal consensus. In this paper, I will defend one 
possible (and particularly attractive) strategy for dealing with the liberal 
consensus: monism – more precisely, I will defend one specific monist approach 
to explanation, a counterfactual theory of explanation. I take monism to be the 
view that there is one single philosophical account capturing both causal and 
non-causal explanations. A monist holds that causal and non-causal explanations 
share a feature that makes them explanatory. Hempel’s covering-law account is 
an instructive historical example for illustrating monism. Hempel argued that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 If causal accounts are taken to be general accounts of scientific explanation, 
then the existence of non-causal explanations is a direct challenge. If causal 
accounts are not taken to be general accounts, then the existence of non-causal 
explanations rather calls for a complementing account of non-causal 
explanations. 
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causal and non-causal explanations are explanatory by virtue of having one 
single feature in common: nomic expectability (Hempel 1965: 352). In the case 
of causal explanations, one expects the explanandum to occur on the basis on 
causal covering laws (laws of succession) and initial conditions; in the non-
causal case, one’s expectations are based on non-causal covering laws (laws of 
coexistence) and initial conditions. However, due to well-known problems of the 
covering-law account (Salmon 1989: 46-50), Hempel’s monism is not a viable 
option for dealing with the liberal consensus. 
 My goal in this paper is to explore a monist account that does not 
collapse into Hempel’s untenable version of monism. I claim that a 
counterfactual theory of explanation is a promising candidate for playing this 
role (building on and elaborating recent work by Frisch 1998; Bokulich 2008; 
Saatsi and Pexton 2013; Reutlinger 2013). However, I do not want to argue for 
full-fledged monism, i.e. the claim that the counterfactual theory captures all 
kinds of non-causal explanations (including the ones listed above). My goal in 
this paper is more modest: I will argue that the counterfactual theory can be 
successfully applied to two paradigmatic examples of non-causal explanations, 
which I take to be representative of a larger class of non-causal explanations: 
Euler’s explanation and the renormalization group explanation of universality.2
   
 The plan of the paper is as follows: in section 2, I introduce the 
counterfactual theory. In section 3, I argue that the counterfactual theory can be 
successfully applied to Euler’s explanation and renormalization group 
explanations of universality.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  One alternative option for dealing with the liberal consensus is the view that 
seemingly non-causal explanations can ultimately be understood as causal 
explanations. Lewis (1986) and Skow (2014) have presented the most 
compelling attempt to spell out this strategy. Lewis and Skow rely on the notion 
of providing information about the causal history of the explanandum. Their 
notion of ‘causal information’ is significantly broader than the notion of 
‘identifying causes of the explanandum’ figuring in the causal accounts I have 
referred to earlier. For instance, Lewis and Skow hold that one explains causally 
by merely excluding a possible causal history of some explanandum E, or by 
stating that E has no cause at all – while other causal accounts would not classify 
this sort of information as causally explanatory. I cannot enter a discussion of 
Lewis’ and Skow’s accounts here. Suffice it to say that I suspect that the notion 
of causal information is ultimately unhelpful because it is too broad. 	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2. The Counterfactual Theory 
Is there a monist alternative to Hempel’s troubled monism? It is fruitful to take a 
suggestion of Peter Lipton’s as a stepping-stone for developing such a monist 
account. Having presented several examples of non-causal explanations, Lipton 
outlines a monist strategy for dealing with (what I call) the liberal consensus: 
“One reaction to this would be to attempt to expand the notion of causation to 
some broader notion of ‘determination’ that would encompass the non-causal 
cases […].” (Lipton 2004: 32) However, Lipton is skeptical as to whether one 
can prevent such a “broader notion of determination” from collapsing into 
Hempelian monism: 
 
This approach has merit, but it will be difficult to come up with 
such a notion that we understand even as well as causation, 
without falling into the relation of deductive determination, which 
will expose the model to many of the objections to the deductive-
nomological model. (Lipton 2004: 32) 
 
I think Lipton was too hasty in dismissing the merit of explicating “some broader 
notion of ‘determination’ that would encompass the non-causal cases” (ibid.), 
because such a philosophical project need not necessarily rely on the covering-
law account and a “relation of deductive determination” (ibid.). Following 
Lipton’s original suggestion, my claim is that Lipton’s envisioned broader notion 
of determination is the notion of the counterfactual dependence (of the 
explanandum on the explanans), as captured by counterfactual theories of 
explanation (for short, CTE). Perhaps the most influential version of the CTE3 is 
James Woodward’s: 
 
An explanation ought to be such that it enables us to see what sort 
of difference it would have made for the explanandum if the 
factors cited in the explanans had been different in various 
possible ways. (Woodward 2003: 11) 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 I adopt Woodward’s terminology in calling it a counterfactual theory. 
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Explanation is a matter of exhibiting systematic patterns of 
counterfactual dependence. (Woodward 2003: 191)  
 
The CTE is appealing from a monist perspective for two reasons: first, 
Woodward’s (2003: §5.3, §5.8) CTE avoids the notorious problems of the 
covering-law account (see below for a qualification of this claim). Second, 
although Woodward’s version of the CTE – and the underlying interventionist 
theory of causation – is mainly intended to fit causal explanations, the core idea 
of the CTE provides a natural way for specifying Lipton’s “broader notion of 
determination”. As Woodward suggests himself (but does not elaborate): 
 
[T]he common element in many forms of explanation, both causal 
and non-causal, is that they must answer what-if-things-had-been-
different questions. (Woodward 2003: 221). 
 
Answering “what-if-things-had-been-different questions” amounts to revealing 
(or exhibiting) – in Woodward’s words – what sort of difference it would have 
made for the explanandum if the factors cited in the explanans had been different 
in various possible ways. The monist proposal, according to the CTE, is that 
causal and non-causal explanations are explanatory by virtue of exhibiting how 
the explanandum counterfactually depends on the explanans (Woodward 2003: 
13). Or, put it in Lipton’s terms, the notion of counterfactual dependence is the 
broader notion of determination that one “expands” from causal explanations 
such that it encompasses the non-causal explanations. This CTE-based monism 
has been explored by Frisch (1998), Bokulich (2008), Saatsi and Pexton (2013), 
Saatsi (forthcoming), and Reutlinger (2013). My goal is to further elaborate and 
advance the CTE and to apply it to two novel examples of non-causal 
explanations that proponents of the CTE have not yet addressed.  
 I will start with reconstructing the CTE in a way that emphasizes the 
“common element” (Woodward 2003: 221) of causal and non-causal 
explanations – this common element, I conjecture, is not essentially tied to an 
interventionist approach to causation (I will return to this issue below). In this 
reconstruction I largely follow Woodward’s (2003: 203) and Woodward and 
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Hitchcock’s (2003: 6, 18) exposition of the CTE. As a first step, the structure of 
an explanation has two parts: first, a statement E about the explanandum 
phenomenon; second, an explanans consisting of generalizations G1, …, Gn and 
auxiliary statements S1, …, Sn. Auxiliary statements often are statements about 
initial or boundary conditions specifying the state of the explanandum system (as 
Hitchcock and Woodward highlight those statements typically assert that 
variables take a certain value). But the auxiliary statements may also comprise 
other kinds of statements useful for explanations (for instance, Nagelian bridge 
laws, symmetry assumptions, limit theorems, and other modeling assumptions). 
According to the CTE, the relationship between the explanans and the 
explanandum is explanatory iff the following conditions are all satisfied: 
 
1. Veridicality condition: G1, …, Gm, S1, …, Sn, and E are (approximately) true 
or, at least, well confirmed. 
2. Implication condition: G1, …, Gm and S1, …, Sn logically entail E or a 
conditional probability P(E|S1, …, Sn) – where the conditional probability 
need not be ‘high’ in contrast to Hempel’s covering-law account. 
3. Dependency condition: G1, …, Gm support at least one counterfactual of the 
form: had S1, …, Sn been different than they actually are (in at least one way 
deemed possible in the light of the generalizations), then E or the conditional 
probability of E would have been different as well.4  
 
The CTE provides a monist framework for causal and non-causal explanations – 
both kinds of explanation are explanatory because they reveal counterfactual 
dependencies between the explanandum and the explanans.  
 Let me add two further remarks in order to sharpen the CTE:  
 First, reviving Hempel’s (1965: 352) intuition that causal and non-causal 
explanations are based on different kinds of laws, one may distinguish between 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4  I assume that a generalization supports counterfactuals only if the 
generalization is non-accidentally true or lawful. (Note that I use a broad notion 
of laws that includes non-strict ceteris paribus laws, such as Woodward and 
Hitckcock’s own invariance account). However, my aim here is not to defend a 
particular view of laws. I want to suggest instead that the CTE is neutral with 
respect to alternative theories of non-accidental truth or lawhood, I which take to 
be a strength of the CTE.  
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causal and non-causal explanations within the CTE framework as follows: causal 
explanations are explanatory in revealing counterfactual dependencies between 
explanandum and explanans that are supported by causal generalizations. Non-
causal explanations are explanatory by virtue of exhibiting counterfactual 
dependencies based on non-causal generalizations. Although I consider the 
causal/non-causal distinction as a primitive for present concerns, I have argued 
for a positive account of how one might draw the distinction (Reutlinger 2013). 
Following Bertrand Russell (1912/13) and present-day Neo-Russellians, I 
propose that causal relations are characterized by criteria such as asymmetry, 
time-asymmetry, distinctness of the relata, metaphysical contingency, and so on. 
These ‘Russellian’ criteria may also be useful for identifying what makes an 
explanation causal, or respectively, non-causal in the CTE framework: causal 
explanations reveal counterfactual dependencies on the basis of generalizations 
that refer to relations instantiating all of the Russellian criteria, while non-causal 
explanations exhibit counterfactual dependencies on the basis of generalizations 
that refer to relations not instantiating all of the Russellian criteria. However, the 
success of the CTE does not depend on my particular proposal for drawing the 
causal/non-causal line. 
 Second, the dependency condition can, to a certain extent, be 
disentangled from an interventionist (or, more generally, causal) interpretation. 
In the context of causal explanations, Woodward interprets the dependency 
condition of the CTE in terms of interventionist counterfactuals whose 
antecedents state “if there were a possible intervention on the initial or boundary 
conditions”. Woodward’s critics have recently argued that interventionist 
counterfactuals are inherently problematic and ultimately dispensable for 
understanding causation and causal explanation (see Strevens 2008; Reutlinger 
2013). Since I want to sidestep this debate, I simply do not assume that the 
counterfactuals mentioned in the dependency conditions need to be understood 
as interventionist counterfactuals. Woodward himself voices another prima facie 
convincing reason for not requiring that all explanatory counterfactuals have the 
form of interventionist counterfactuals: “When a theory or derivation answers a 
what-if-things-had-been different question but we cannot interpret this as an 
answer to a question about what would happen under an intervention, we may 
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have a non-causal explanation of some sort.” (2003: 221) Based on these two 
reasons, I assume, in the dependency condition, that the CTE should generally 
rely on non-interventionist counterfactuals of the form “if S1, …, Sn had been 
different than they actually are (in at least one way deemed possible in the light 
of the generalizations), then E or the conditional probability of E would have 
been different as well”.5 There is a positive analogy to Woodward’s causal CTE 
regarding the existentially quantified form of the counterfactuals: the 
qualification ‘in at least one way deemed possible in the light of the 
generalizations’ is analogous to the interventionist requirement that there be 
some possible intervention on the antecedent variable that leads to a change in 
the consequent variable; it is not required that all possible interventions have 
such an effect. 
 I anticipate a potential worry at this point. One may wonder whether the 
non-causal version of the CTE avoids the problems of the covering-law account. 
I assume here that the causal version of the CTE successfully solves these 
problems. I can only sketch how the non-causal version of the CTE responds to 
these problems. (a) To avoid counterexamples such as the birth-control pills 
scenario (Salmon 1989: 50), the non-causal CTE distinguishes between 
explanatorily relevant and irrelevant factors as follows: a factor is relevant if the 
explanandum counterfactually depends on it (dependency condition), otherwise 
it is an irrelevant factor. (b) To deal with the syphilis-paresis scenario (Salmon 
1989: 49), the non-causal CTE allows for low probability explanations 
(implication condition). Finally, having the notorious flagpole-shadow scenario 
in mind (Salmon 1989: 47), one may wonder whether the CTE accounts for the 
explanatory asymmetry in the case of non-causal explanations. This is one of the 
deepest puzzles of the current philosophy of explanation – not merely affecting 
the CTE – and it is an open research question as to how one can capture the 
explanatory asymmetry in the non-causal cases. It is even possible that non-
causal explanations do not generally display such an asymmetry. This complex 
question will have to be addressed in another paper (for one recent attempts to 
make progress on the issue, see Lange 2011).   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5  Reutlinger (2013) provide an in-depth discussion of non-interventionist 
counterfactuals and their semantics.  
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3. Applying the Counterfactual Theory 
I will now argue for the claim that the CTE applies to two paradigmatic 
examples of non-causal explanations. I will first apply the CTE to Euler’s 
explanation (Section 3.1), and, then, to renormalization group explanations of 
universality (section 3.2). 
 
3.1 Euler’s Explanation 
Let me start with an intuitively simple but powerful non-causal explanation (see 
Pincock 2012: 51-53; Lange 2013a: 489). In 1736, Königsberg had four parts of 
town and seven bridges connecting these parts. Interestingly, no one ever 
succeeded in the attempt to cross all of the bridges exactly once. This surprising 
fact calls for an explanation. The mathematician Leonhard Euler provided an 
explanation. Euler’s explanation starts with representing relevant aspects of 
Königsberg’s geography with a graph. A simplified geographical map of 
Königsberg in 1736 represents only the four parts of town (the two islands A and 
B, and the two riverbanks C and D) and the seven bridges (part A is connected to 
5 bridges, parts B, C and D are each connected to 3 bridges). This simplified 
geography of Königsberg can also be represented by a graph, in which the nodes 
represent the parts of town A-D and the edges represent the bridges.  
 Given this graph-theoretical representation, Euler defines an Euler path 
as a path through a graph G that includes each edge in G exactly once. Euler uses 
the notion of an Euler path to reformulate the explanandum in terms of the 
question: why has everyone failed to traverse Königsberg on an Euler path? His 
answer to this why-question has two components: 
 
1. Euler’s theorem: there is an Euler path through a graph G iff G is an Eulerian 
graph. Euler proved that a graph G is Eularian iff (i) all the nodes in G are 
connected to an even number of edges, or (ii) exactly two nodes in G (one of 
which we take as our starting point) are connected to an odd number of edges 
(Pincock 2012: 51).  
2. Contingent fact: The actual bridges and parts of Königsberg are not 
isomorphic to an Eulerian graph, because conditions (i) and (ii) in the 
definition of an Eulerian graph are not satisfied: no part of town 
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(corresponding to the nodes) is connected to an even number of bridges 
(corresponding to the edges), violating condition (i); and more than two parts 
of town (corresponding to the nodes) are connected to an odd number of 
bridges (corresponding to the edges), violating condition (ii).. Königsberg 
could have been isomorphic to an Eulerian graph in 1736, but as a matter of 
contingent fact it was not. 
 
Therefore, Euler concludes, there is no Euler path through the actual Königsberg. 
This explains why nobody ever succeeded in crossing all of the bridges of 
Königsberg exactly once. 
 Does the CTE capture Euler’s explanation? Euler’s explanation has the 
structure demanded by the CTE: the explanans consists of Euler’s theorem (a 
mathematical and intuitively non-causal generalization) and the statement that all 
parts are actually connected to an odd number of bridges. The explanandum 
phenomenon is that everyone has failed to cross the city on an Euler path. 
Moreover, all three conditions that the CTE imposes on the relation between 
explanans and explanandum are satisfied: 
  
1. The veridicality condition holds because (a) Euler’s theorem, (b) the 
statement about the ‘contingent fact’ that each part of Königsberg is actually 
connected to an odd number of bridges, and (c) the explanandum statement 
are all true.   
2. The implication condition is met, since Euler’s theorem together with the 
statement about the ‘contingent fact’ entail the explanandum statement.  
3. The dependency condition is satisfied, because Euler’s theorem supports the 
counterfactual “if all parts of Königsberg were connected to an even number 
of bridges, or if exactly two parts of town were connected to an odd number 
of bridges, then there would be an Euler path through Königsberg”. 
 
Therefore, I conclude that the CTE applies to Euler’s explanation. 
 
3.2 Renormalization Group Explanations 
So-called renormalization group (RG, for short) explanations constitute another, 
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technically more sophisticated, kind of non-causal explanation (see Batterman 
2000, 2002).6 RG explanations are intended to provide understanding of why 
microscopically different physical systems display the same macro-behavior 
when undergoing phase-transitions. For instance, near the critical temperature, 
the phenomenology of transitions of a fluid from a liquid to a vaporous phase, or 
of a metal from a magnetic to a demagnetized phase is (in some respects) the 
same, although liquids and metals are significantly different on the micro-level. 
This ‘sameness’ or – to use a more technical term – ‘universality’ of the macro-
behavior is characterized by a critical exponent that takes the same value for 
microscopically very different systems (Batterman 2000: 125-126). How do 
physicists explain the remarkable fact that there is universal macro-behavior? 
 For the sake of brevity, it is useful to understand the workings of RG 
explanations as consisting of three key explanatory elements: (1) Hamiltonians, 
(2) RG transformations, and (3) the flow of Hamiltonians. There is a fourth 
element – the laws of statistical mechanics, including the partition function – 
which I will leave in the background, for sake of brevity (Norton 2012: 227; see 
Wilson 1983). The exposition of these elements will be non-technical because 
the paper is concerned with a non-technical question (see Batterman [2000: 137-
144]; for a more detailed exposition see Fisher 1982, 1998; and Wilson 1983). 
 
1. Hamiltonians: The Hamiltonian is a function characterizing, among other 
things, the energy of the interactions between the components of the system. 
One characteristic of the Hamiltonian of a physical system undergoing phase 
transition (say, a heating pot of water undergoing a transition from a liquid to 
a gaseous phase) is that each component of such a system does not merely 
interact with its nearby neighbors but also with distant components; in fact, 
the correlation length diverges (and becomes infinite). Adopting Batterman’s 
terminology, I call this complicated Hamiltonian of a system undergoing a 
phase transition the “initial” or “original” Hamiltonian. 
2. Renormalization group transformations: Keeping track of the interactions 
between all the components of a system undergoing a phase transition is – 
given the large number of components and the diverging correlation length – 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 I argue for the non-causal character of RG explanations in Reutlinger (2014). 
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practically impossible. So-called renormalization group transformations 
(henceforth, RG transformations) deal with this intractability by redefining 
the characteristic length, at which the interactions among the components of 
the system at issue are described. Repeatedly applying RG transformations 
amounts to a re-description of the system, say fluid F, on larger and larger 
length scales (while preserving the mathematical form of the original 
Hamiltonian). The transformed Hamiltonian describes a system (and the 
interactions between its components) with less degrees of freedom than the 
original Hamiltonian. In sum, the RG transformation is a mathematically 
sophisticated coarse-graining procedure eliminating micro-details that are 
irrelevant for the explanation of universality.  
3. The flow of Hamiltonians: Suppose we start with the original Hamiltonian H 
of a fluid F undergoing a phase transition. Then, one repeatedly applies the 
RG transformation and obtains other more ‘coarse-grained’ Hamiltonians. 
Interestingly, these different Hamiltonians “flow” into a fixed point in the 
space of possible Hamiltonians, which describes a specific behavior 
characterized by a critical exponent (Batterman 2000: 143). Now suppose 
there is another fluid F* and its behavior (during phase transition) is 
described by the initial Hamiltonian H*. Repeatedly applying the RG 
transformation to H* generates other, more ‘coarse-grained’ Hamiltonians. If 
the Hamiltonians representing fluid F* and fluid F turn out to “flow” to the 
same fixed point, then their behavior, when undergoing phase transition, is 
characterized by the same critical exponent (Fisher 1982: 85; Batterman 
2000: 143). 
 
In sum, the three elements of an RG explanation allow us to determine whether 
systems with different original Hamiltonians belong to the same “universality 
class” and are characterized by the same critical exponent (Fisher 1982: 87). 
Two systems belong to the same universality class, if reiterating RG 
transformations reveals that both systems “flow” to the same fixed point.  
 Now the decisive question is whether the CTE applies to RG 
explanations. First, RG explanations exhibit the required structure. The 
explanandum phenomenon is the occurrence of universal macro-behavior. The 
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explanans of an RG explanation consists of the system-specific Hamiltonians 
describing the energy state of the physical systems in question – and, strictly 
speaking, the laws of statistical mechanics (the fourth element in the 
background); RG transformations and the flow of Hamiltonians are central 
auxiliary assumptions in the explanans (see Section 2).  
 Second, the conditions that the CTE requires to hold are also satisfied: 
  
1. The veridicality condition is satisfied, because the explanandum statement 
(that there is universal behavior) and the explanans can – at least for present 
purposes – be considered as being (approximately) true or at least well 
confirmed. Due to space limits, I cannot discuss the role of idealizations 
(especially, limit theorems) in RG explanations posing a potential threat to 
the truth of the explanans. However, there are interpretations of the 
idealizations in question that are consistent with the veridicality condition 
(see Strevens 2008; Norton 2012).    
2. The implication condition holds, since the RG explanans entails that many 
physical systems with different original Hamiltonians display the same 
macro-behavior.  
3. The dependency conditions is met, because the RG explanans supports some 
counterfactuals of the form:  
 
“There is a physically possible Hamiltonian H* such that: if (1) a 
physical system had the original Hamiltonian H* (instead of its actual 
original Hamiltonian H), if (2) H* were subject to repeated RG 
transformations, and if (3) we determined the resulting flow of the 
Hamiltonians to a fixed point, then a system with original H* would be in 
a different universality class than a system with original Hamiltonian H”.  
 
Let me elaborate why I believe some counterfactuals of this form are true in 
the light of RG theory. To avoid misunderstandings, a counterfactual of this 
form is not true for every physically possible (original) Hamiltonian, because 
the main accomplishment of RG explanations is to show that many systems 
with different original Hamiltonians belong to the same universality class. 
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However, the dependency condition of the CTE does not require that the 
explanandum depend on all possible changes in the intitial conditions. 
Instead the condition merely requires that the explanandum counterfactually 
depend on some possible changes in the explanans. The latter claim receives 
support from RG theory, which (also) shows that and why some systems 
with different original Hamiltonians do not exhibit the same macro-behavior 
and in fact belong to different universality classes (Wilson 1983). As 
Batterman (2000: 127) points out, RG explanations reveal that belonging to a 
particular universality class depends on features such as the symmetry 
properties of the order parameter and the spatial dimensionality of the 
physical system. Hence, if systems with H* and H – figuring in the 
counterfactual above – differ with respect to those features, then the 
counterfactual at issue seems to be true, according to RG theory. 
 
Therefore, the CTE successfully captures RG explanations. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
A ‘liberal consensus’ has emerged in the recent philosophy of scientific 
explanation: there are causal and non-causal explanations. In order to deal with 
the liberal consensus, I have argued for the counterfactual theory of explanation 
(the CTE). According to the CTE, causal and non-causal explanations are 
explanatory by virtue of revealing counterfactual dependencies between the 
explanandum and the explanans. I have argued that the CTE is applicable to two 
paradigms of non-causal explanations: Euler’s explanation and renormalization 
group explanations of universality. For this reason, I believe that the CTE is a 
promising monist approach that deserves more attention and discussion. 
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